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from the eet. Try and avoid getting caught in silly luf ng battles (as you may end up sailing back to the windward mark), unless you are trying to slow the other boat down (and are not worried about slowing yourself down).

Figure 20.14 In uence diagram for the two-staged exploration decision. (Canadian Electricity Association, Guide to Dam Safety Risk Management, forthcoming.)

Let s proceed to investigate the newly decrypted function. It starts with two calls to the traditional NtDelayExecution . Then the function proceeds to call what appears to be NtOpenFile through the obfuscated interface, with the string \ \C: hard-coded right there in the middle of the code. After NtOpenFile the function calls NtQueryVolumeInformationFile with the FileFsVolumeInformation information level flag. It then reads offset +8 from the returned data structure and stores it in the local variable [406020]. Offset +8 in data structure FILE_FS_VOLUME_INFORMATION is VolumeSerialNumber (this information was also obtained at http:// undocumented.ntinternals.net). This is a fairly typical copy protection sequence, in a slightly different flavor. The primary partition s volume serial number is a good way to create computer-specific dependencies. It is a 32-bit number that s randomly assigned to a partition when it s being formatted. The value is retained until the partition is formatted. Utilizing this value in a serial-number-based copy protection means that serial numbers cannot be shared between users on different computers each computer has a different serial number. One slightly unusual thing about this is that Defender is obtaining this value directly using the native API. This is typically done using the GetVolumeInformation Win32 API. You ve pretty much reached the end of the current function. Before returning it makes yet another call to NtDelayExecution, invokes RDTSC, loads the low-order word into EAX as the return value (to make for a garbage return value), and goes back to the beginning to reencrypt itself.

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Back at the main entry point function, you find another call to NtDelay Execution which is followed by a call into what appears to be the final function call (other than that apparently useless call to IsDebuggerPresent) in the program entry point, 402082. Naturally, 402082 is also encrypted, so you will set a breakpoint on 402198, which is right after the decryption code is done decrypting. You immediately start seeing familiar bits of code (if Olly is still showing you junk instead of code at this point, you can either try stepping into that code and see if automatically fixes itself or you can specifically tell Olly to treat these bytes as code by right-clicking the first line and selecting Analysis. During next analysis, treat selection as Command). You will see a call to NtDelayExecution, followed by a sequence that loads a new DLL: SHELL32.DLL. The loading is followed by the creation of the obfuscated module interface: allocating memory at a random address, creating checksums for each of the exported SHELL32.DLL names, and copying the entire code section into the newly allocated memory block. After all of this the program calls a KERNEL32.DLL that

information about whether or not sand lenses exist. Once this additional information has been gathered, a new (posterior) probability of a lens existing is calculated through Bayes Theorem, and a decision on remedial actions revisited. After a decision on remedial actions is taken, and a lens turns out either to exist or not to exist, some performance result obtains. Before the fact, of course, this performance result can only be described probabilistically.

has a pure user-mode implementation, which forces you to use the function index method It turns out the API is GetCommandLineW Indeed, it returns a pointer to our test command line The next call is to a SHELL32DLL API Again, a SHELL32 API would probably never make a direct call down into the kernel, so you re just stuck with some long function and you ve no idea what it is You have to use the function s index again to figure out which API Defender is calling This time it turns out that it s CommandLineToArgvW CommandLineToArgvW performs parsing on a command-line string and returns an array of strings, each containing a single parameter Defender must call this function directly because it doesn t make use of a runtime library, which usually takes care of such things.

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